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Politics 
 
CONFUSED 
 
A Gallup Romania survey commissioned by SAR shows that 
despite public opinion not perceiving any major change in the 
country, the voting options are strongly in favor of the D.A. 
Alliance. The government however has reached a threshold, 
having as many supporters as skeptics towards its performance. 
 
While waiting for the EC country report, the Romanian internal public opinion 
seems to be less affected by the incessant political scandals, as by the 
perception of the daily realities. Most of Romanians preserve their optimism, 
47% considering that the country heads to the right direction, comparing to 
the 43% thinking that the direction is wrong1. The opinion of the Romanians 
varies according to different segments: from institutions, the evolution of the 
police received the most optimistic appreciations, whereas the evolution of 
the health system is generally perceived pessimistically. The opinions 
concerning the education and justice remain still divided, with pessimists 
having the upper hand (Fig. 1). 
Regarding the government’s performance, the opinions are strictly divided. 
While half of the Romanians believe the government is able to solve the 
problems of the country, the other half does not. With only nine months in 
office and facing the winter ahead, the government could do much better. 
On the other hand, the two months debate on the political crisis and floods 
left their imprints.  
When we analyze the solutions suggested to improve government 
performance, the opinions are again much divided. The majority of those 
believing that the government does a good job consider as the best solution 
to reshuffle the ministers who are not good enough, while those having a bad 
opinion about the government prefer simply to replace the Prime Minister. The 
two sides, both for and against the government, are contributing in similar 
proportions to the group of those preferring to have early elections, which is 
actually the minority option for both groups.  
                                                 
1 The results reported in the paper derive from a survey completed by Gallup Romania 
at the request of SAR. 1050 subjects were interviewed in the second week of 
September.  
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Finally, the option of reshuffling as you go is the most popular while it stands by 
itself, while the most radical options taken together (replacement of the Prime 
Minister, early elections, other options) gather more preferences. A significant 
part of those supporting the moderate option, which is the reshuffling, 
representing the largest group, would not vote in the eventuality of early 
elections.  
Voting option shows a large majority for the D.A. Alliance which would have 
more than 20% ahead of PSD, and a fairly good performance for the Great 
Romania Popular Party (PPRM). Tomorrow’s vote would appear more 
concentrated than yesterday’s vote, with the two main parties gathering 
more than 80% of the votes. The turnout in case of early elections would be 
similar for both political camps.  
Fig. 1. Fragile optimism
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Fig. 2. On the fence
In your opinion, can the current government solve the socio-
economic problems of Romania?
No
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Fig. 3. Solution?
What is the best solution for increasing government's 
effectiveness?
Other (technocratic 
cabinet, 
presidential 
cabinet, direct rule 
by Europe, etc)
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Fig. 5. Change, or not quite? 
How are the current leaders compared with the previous ones?
less, 19%
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same 46%
same, 42%
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Professional
Fig. 4. Voting intentions
If elections are held in two weeks from now, you will vote for:
UDMR, 6%
PPCD (ex PNŢCD)
below 1%
Other
below 1%
PC (ex PUR)
 below 1%
PPRM, 9%
DA Alliance, 52%
PSD, 31%
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The change is not perceived by the majority of the people, who does not see 
much difference between those governing the country nowadays and those 
governing it before the elections. There is a small majority at the level of those 
perceiving the present power as less corrupt, but for the majority of voters 
there are no major differences between the left and right parties regarding 
their integrity and professionalism.  
The lack of interest towards the political events remains widespread. Even 
though 76 % state that they would come to polls in case of early elections, 
only one third reckon they have sufficient knowledge to cast an informed 
vote. 14% of Romanians still believe that PSD governs Romania, only 48 % are 
aware that UDMR is part of the government, and only 38 % only know that PUR 
is also part of the government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is it possible that a political clarification arises in these circumstances? Until 
now, the main actors have played only losing cards. Thus, the Prime Minister 
Tariceanu tried to compensate the lack of early elections by replacing the 
two oppositional presidents of the Chamber and the Senate and ended up by 
showing that the current govt coalition is not as professional as PSD in the art 
of parliamentary skirmishes. The President tried to promote the early elections, 
damaging meanwhile the reputation of the government as being controlled 
by various groups of interests. As PD could not go by itself to the early elections 
and it is bound to join PNL, the strategy of discrediting those pushed to 
elections is rather hazardous. PSD tried to emerge as a co-operative 
opposition force, but the way in which it blocked the two chambers of the 
Parliament showed that its force consists mostly in obstruction and no 
responsible government would commit itself to reforms in a Parliament having 
its agenda in the Parliament controlled by Mr. Năstase and Văcăroiu.  
During the last week, there was an outburst of populist proposals, from the 
uninominal vote to a unicameral Parliament. These proposals suggest that the 
Fig. 6. Who governs?
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emergency became again a reform of the political system. A debate is 
needed, but changes to political system should not be made into priorities or 
solutions to the problems, as their potential to solve the current problems is 
zero, because of the following reasons:   
• Any constitutional change supposes a vote requiring the presence of two 
thirds of the reunited chambers of Parliament. It is hilarious to believe that a 
Parliament which does not have enough majority in order to introduce a 
reform on the agenda or to vote its own regulations, would meet the 
required consensus for deep constitutional changes.  
• The main problem of the Romanian political class, and consequently of the 
government, lies in its incapacity to generate and support a public sector 
able to function on impersonal and objective grounds, instead of personal 
and subjective ones. This leads to an underperformance of the State 
apparatus in view of the good quality of human resources available in 
Romania. This problem affects similarly those nominally elected and those 
elected on the lists, the local and the central level of government. 
Therefore it is independent to the type of institution and consequently it 
can not be solved by continuously changing the type of Parliament, the 
electoral system, etc., even though numerous improvements may be 
theoretically undertaken to the above mentioned institutions.  
 
What are the possible solutions? To address this problem, SAR recommends the 
following steps:  
1. Reaching a consensus about the main problem to which we seek solutions, 
as the confusion expanded even in this matter. There is not anymore a 
realist and common vision on what the main problem is and without a 
hierarchy of the main issues, the different actors will keep on investing 
anarchically, in opposite directions.  
2. Reaching a consensus on the immediate strategy to follow in order to solve 
the main problem, as well as on the long term strategies for the other 
issues.  
3. Negotiating these solutions with the social partners, civil society, informing 
on time the public about the intentions of the government. 
 
All these are basic issues. But somehow this is not how the government 
coalition operates presently. Therefore SAR recommends that any new reforms 
of the institutions should be looked on skeptically, as much more simple 
instruments within reach of politicians are not used. The government, the 
political parties and the presidency have enough instruments at their disposal 
to improve governance. Their good will is shown particularly by the 
nominations and the promotions they do, as well as by monitoring the people 
appointed in the office.  
Regarding the political parties, they will have to build internal structures to 
monitor integrity. As long as the parties operate both at the central and local 
level with questionable people and are not interested in setting up a system of 
professionalism and integrity, they are not entitled to complain that other 
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political actors such as the President or the civil society undertake attempts to 
clarify them from outside and support their negative image. The reform of the 
political class cannot progress unless there is an internal reform of the parties. 
Not the State institutions should always be capsized, but the parties should be 
changed, probably also with the support of the future Agency of Integrity 
which will verify the conflict of interests and the properties of politicians and 
civil servants. 
The undertaking of President Băsescu to force through a direct popular 
consultation the reform of the political system is legitimate, as the president 
itself was elected with such a mandate. But is the task a realistic one? Did the 
president properly weigh the instruments at his disposal and is he sure he will 
accomplish anything else but fuelling countless talk-shows in mass-media? 
During the reshuffling of the ministers, which is a minor reproduction of the 
early elections, the number of the state secretaries from the Foreign Affairs 
almost doubled, but the ministry has failed so far to deliver any concrete 
proposal in the realm of the famous zero priorities. The foreign policy is 
subordinated to the President, thus emerging the obvious question why 
doesn’t he put into effect his influence in order to create an exemplary area 
of government, an example for the rest of central administration. It is obvious 
that the present administration is less corrupt than the Năstase government, 
but the increasing number of state secretaries, counselors or directors whose 
positions are justified only by the necessity of awarding offices to some clients 
with no expertise in these fields is a source of concern. Tax increases are 
planned in order to increase the budgetary income, without even a minimal 
examination of the waste in the central administration. Of course, having the 
European integration as main priority, a reform of the government comes only 
secondly. But even its future accomplishment seems impossible if today 
practices and individuals are encouraged which will become the main 
impediment to any future substantial changes.  
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Economy 
 
ROMANIA’s JOURNEY TO LOW INFLATION: RECORD AND 
POLICY DILEMMAS   
 
Romania’s GDP grew by an annual average of over 5% during 2000-
2004 and a similar rate is expected in 2005. Inflation came down to 9.3% 
in 2004 (from over 40% in 2000) and a further drop, to 8.3-8.4% is likely in 
2005. Fiscal consolidation has been under way for several years now 
with budget deficits close to –1% of GDP lately. The private sector 
produces almost 70% of GDP while the banking sector is on a much 
sounder foot. Romania’s accession in 2007 and catching up prospects 
hinge on furthering structural and institutional reforms.  
 
Aspirant countries to EU accession are asked to comply with two fundamental 
requirements: to have a “functioning market economy”; and to withstand 
competitive pressures inside the economic and, eventually, the monetary 
union.  The first requirement – “the existence of a functioning market 
economy”2 – connotes an institutional set up (the functioning of basic market 
institutions) which would enable, inter alia, effective financial discipline (exit 
and entry market take place easily), proper law enforcement and protection 
of property rights,  effective financial intermediation, an adequate policy mix 
framework, which ensures efficacy in dealing with powerful adverse shocks.  
The second demand takes cognizance of the dramatic reduction of the 
scope of national economic policy in a region where intra-trade barriers no 
longer exist, capital flows freely, in which a single currency and one monetary 
policy operates in 12 (out of 15) old member countries, and in which, in a 
softer form, the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM2) would constrain exchange 
rate policy in the new member states significantly, etc. Both exigencies are 
seen as essential for enhancing nominal and real convergence –without 
which the Union would be undermined from within.    
As a matter fact, the lack of sufficient convergence inside the Union and 
competitive pressures from outside, as well as increasingly strained welfare 
systems point to a more complicated picture when it comes to explaining the 
                                                 
2 A “functioning market economy” is quite curious terminologically; this notion cannot 
be found in an economic textbook, since all market economies are functioning, 
whether well or bad. What the experts in Brussels have, most likely, in mind is a “well 
functioning market economy”, which relies on a sound institutional setup and low 
information and transaction costs for the sake of needed resource reallocation. 
P O L I C Y  W A R N I N G  R E P O R T  −  S E P T E M B E R  2 0 0 5  
 
11 
sources of economic performance and EU fitness. The Lisbon Agenda is a 
reflection of this reality check, but also of the inability of many of the EU 
member states to find adequate responses to global competition and social 
strain. Against this backdrop one can judge the growing mefience vis-à-vis 
further enlargement – to low-wage countries – among citizens of “Old Europe” 
and the more severe scrutiny Romania is going to face in its quest to join the 
Club in 2007.  
There is an additional angle through which Romania’s quest to join the Union 
can be judged –as a means to cope with a developmental challenge of long 
vintage. With an income per capita of cca 30% of the EU average Romania 
has a long way to go in this regard.  Furthering structural reforms would 
enhance the ability to catch up economically. 
 
I. Where does Romania’s economy come from 
The last decade presents a complicated story of transition in Romania. Major 
disputes concerning privatization, the pace of economic reforms, the attitude 
towards foreign capital, translated into political fighting that influenced the 
coherence and consistency of reform policy. Romania experienced a sinuous 
economic evolution, of the boom and bust type, with major fluctuations of 
output and persistent high inflation. 
Economic recovery/growth since 2000 
The year 2000 revealed signs of economic recovery; the fall of economic 
activity was reversed, inflation started again to come down and an export 
boom took place. The GDP rose by 2.1% in 2000 and inflation came down to 
40.7%. Significantly, too, although Romania experienced troubles on its 
financial markets during that year, the banking system withstood the pressure 
and continued its convalescence (after the failures of two major state owned 
banks). As a matter of fact, a massive cleaning up of the banking system has 
taken place in the last few years. At the same time, the share of the private 
sector in the banking system increased considerably.3  
Growth speeded up during 2001- 2003, when it hovered around 5%. In 2004 it 
jumped to over 8% owing to a remarkable harvest. For 2005 the growth rate is 
to stay around 5%. During all this period fiscal consolidation has been under 
way; the budget deficit came down to 1.1% in 2004, and quasi fiscal deficits 
have narrowed.  For 2005 the budget deficit will stay close to 1.0% of GDP, 
which takes into account the effects of the big floods of this year.  
The progress with disinflation is particularly commendable during the last few 
years,  for Romania was an outlier in this regard until recently. Likewise, the rise 
in the reserves of the Central bank to over 17 billion euro (in September 2005) is 
a plus at a time when the capital account liberalization is almost complete. 
The Central Bank (National Bank of Romania) has weathered quite 
successfully the access of non-residents to local bank accounts and local 
currency denominated interest rates have been declining during this period. 
These results have prompted upgrades from the main rating agencies. Thus, 
                                                 
3 The last two state owned banks (Banca Comerciala Romaana, and the Savings 
Bank/CEC) are slated for privatization in the period to come.   
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Romania got investment grades from Fitch in 2004 (BBB-), and from S&P a year 
later.   
A major novelty of 2005 is a fiscal policy reform, via a 16% flat tax, which has 
aimed at boosting inward FDI and making the economy more transparent. This 
reform can be judged on its own, but also, within the context of fiscal 
competition that is taking place throughout Central and Eastern Europe. A 
downside, however, of the fiscal reform is that it was done pro-cyclically, at a 
time when the economy was being fuelled primarily by domestic demand 
and external deficits were growing quite rapidly; this means that a fiscal 
stimulus was hardly welcome at this moment in time and, consequently, the 
Government was forced to adopt a series of compensatory measures in order 
to boost budget revenues and control expenditure. In addition, the fiscal 
reform did not touch social security contributions which, at 49.5%, are among 
the highest in the Region and do not enhance job creation in the official 
economy. 
What has spoiled the picture somewhat in recent years is the surge of the 
current account deficit, which grew to 6.9% of GDP in 2004 (compared to 5.6% 
in 2003 and 3.6% in 2002); by including non-repatriated profits the deficit came 
close to 7.8% in 2004.  The rise of the current account deficit in the first 
semester of 2005 is about 60% (as against the corresponding period of 2004), 
which may bring it to above 9.3% for the whole year. The major expansion of 
domestic credit (of hard currency denominated, in particular)  and exchange 
rate appreciation are at the roots of this big rise. The surge in imports includes 
machinery and equipment, which is good for industrial renewal. However, the 
speed of the rise in external deficits should ring the bell. 
The volume of FDI (which stood at over 12 billion euro at the end of 2004) is 
considerably below the volume registered in Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic.  Inward foreign direct investment is needed in order to restructure 
and modernize the real economy, energy production and distribution 
included.  
Table 1: evolution of main macroeconomic indicators in Romania 
                                                2000        2001     2002         2003         2004     2005*       
______________________________________________________________________ 
-Real GDP, % change            2.1            5.7        4.9           4.8             8.3       5 
-Inflation (CPI) 
End of Dec.                           40.7         30.3      17.8          14.1             9.3      8.3 
-Unemployment                    10.5           8.8        8.4            7.4             6.2     5.8    
-Budget deficit                      -3.5         -3.3      -2.7            -2.3           -1.1       -0.8 
-Current account 
deficit                                     -5.7         -5.6      -3.6            -5.8           -6.9        -9.3 
-Total ext. debt,  
% GDP                                    30            31         35               32           30          32 
% of exports                           80            81          85              85            81         80 
            
Source: National statistics and own estimates; * own forecasts.   
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II. Economic performance: pluses and minuses  
Romania’s economic performance has improved substantially in recent years; 
this  motivated the European Commission to grant  the status of a “functioning 
market economy” in 2004. But this status cannot obscure significant 
weaknesses with regard to financial discipline, enforcement of market 
regulations, transparency and stability of the regulatory framework, the public 
administration and the judiciary, the strain in the pensions system. The 
deepening of reforms has to make the economy stronger, capable of 
withstanding pressures inside the Union.  
Economic progress to build upon 
Romania’s economic advance should be judged from two perspectives: one 
that looks at structural changes in the economy; and one focused on 
macroeconomic policy.  
The steady expansion of the private sector in the economy has been 
accompanied by more entrepreneurial drive, more capital formation and 
export orientation. The private sector’s contribution to GDP formation is 
nearing 70% while it accounts for over 55% of social capital in the economy 
and more than 70% of the employed population. There has also been a 
significant rise in foreign trade and integration into EU markets; trade with the 
EU means cca 2/3of overall trade. Openness of the economy is also indicated 
by the share of foreign capital in the banking industry and 
telecommunication; energy markets have been also opening quite rapidly, 
incidentally, more than in some of the old EU member countries (though one 
has to stress here the importance of effective regulations so that new owners 
of pubic utilities should not abuse their market power).  
The banking system is much sounder nowadays, after a massive clean up 
operation in the late 90s and the introduction of a new regulatory framework 
that fits the BIS new recommendations. This evolution has taken place on the 
background of increasing foreign ownership in the banking sector, which has 
meliorated corporate governance .  The banking system has increased its 
capacity to provide effective intermediation between savers and investors, 
and lending and borrowing rates have decreased substantially. The range of 
financial products has increased remarkably and has fuelled non-
governmental credit;4 the latter has boomed by over 70% , in real terms, in the 
last couple of years. It is noticeable that despite this rise prudential indicators 
are still in safe territory5. The non-banking financial sector has developed 
rapidly; the best indicator is the market capitalization of the Bucharest Stock 
Exchange: from 1.04% of GDP in 1999 and 3.3% of GDP in 2001, it moved to 8% 
of GDP in 2003 and cca. 14% of GDP in the first half of 2005.  
An adequate macroeconomic policy mix has under-lied disinflation (table 1). 
The Central Bank has focused more clearly on fighting inflation and fiscal 
consolidation has helped it. Albeit quasi-fiscal deficits still blurs this assessment 
                                                 
4 The annual yield for t-bills, which was a major attraction for banks’ investment policy, 
decreased from 76.0%  in 1999 and 35.7% in 2001 to 17.3% in 2002 and cca 8% in June 
2005; this has prompted banks to orient increasingly toward consumer and production 
finance. 
5 Even if some numbers are likely to be overstated the overall picture evinces a 
remarkable turnaround as against the late 90s. 
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it is encouraging that they have shown a tendency of decline lately. Likewise, 
budget subsidies have declined steadily and energy prices have come close 
to EU wide levels, which should improve resource allocation and cost 
management, though it is quite painful for low-income people.  
Table2:Key prudential indicators in the banking system 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
2004 
Solvency 
rate (>12%) 
17.9 23.7 28.8 25.0 21.09   
18.79 
Bad loans, 
as % of 
total assets 
2.36 0.29 0.32 0.23 0.22      
0.18 
Credit risk 
rate 
35.4 3.8 2.5 1.1 3.37       
2.85 
Source: NBR NBR statistics (monthly bulletins) 
Capital adequacy – net assets / total assets; Credit risk – unadjusted exposure relative to loans 
and interest under “doubtful” or “loss”/ total loans and interest excluding off-balance sheet 
items 
 
 
Table 3. Key macroeconomic indicators compared to Maastricht criteria:   EU 
candidate countries one year before they got into the Union (2003) and 
Romania in 2004 
 Budget 
deficit (% of 
GDP) 
Public debt 
(% of GDP) 
Inflation (%) Interest rate on 
10 years € bond 
(%) 
Exchange 
rate stability 
Target -3 60 <2.8 <6.8 yes 
Czech 
Republic 
-7.8 34.5 0.4 4.63(23/6/2014
) 
No 
 
Hungary -5.5 56.8 4.7 5.5(6/5/2014) No 
Poland -4.6 44.8 0.8 4.5 (5/2/2013) No 
Slovakia -5.2 43.8 8.1 4.5(20/5/2014) No 
Romania -1.1                27 9.3 - No 
Source: Countries’ national banks 
 
The openness of the economy has been broadened functionally by capital 
account liberalization (KAL), which is almost complete (access of non-
residents to local bank accounts  was allowed in April 2005). KAL has been 
quite complicated because of relatively high interest rate differentials and 
substantial speculative inflows. The Central Bank has been walking on a tight 
rope in this respect, but it has done it commendably. A negative fallout, 
however, it the surge of external deficits owing to the appreciation of the 
Romanian currency and the big rise of domestic credit. It should be said that 
KAL is a prerequisite for EU accession6 and relates to direct inflation targeting. 
                                                 
6 Capital account liberalization in Romania can be seen as optimization under severe 
constraints, for interest rate differentials and low monetization (share of financial 
intermediation in GDP) would have justified a more gradual process. But, EU accession 
demands full KAL at the time of entry. 
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The latter indicates the wish of the Romanian central bank (NBR) to bolster its 
operational independence and focus even more on reducing inflation. 
It is instructive to compare the current state of the Romanian economy with 
the situation of some new EU member countries one year before they got into 
the Union (table 3)7: comparatively Romania does not fare much worse. 
 
What clouds the sky  
But serious weaknesses persist in the Romanian economy, which could harm 
macroeconomic conditions and GDP growth over the longer term unless they 
are addressed consistently. This caveat does not refer to unavoidable business 
cycle related fluctuations, but to a possible relapse into  revived inflation and 
balance of payments difficulties. These weaknesses are rooted in:  
• loss making companies that produce sizeable arrears and quasi- fiscal 
deficits. The current disinflation puts pressure on these companies, and 
unless restructuring makes more headway persistent large quasi-fiscal-
deficits would clobber the public budget in the years to come.  
• budget revenues are around 30% of GDP while financing needs are 
bulging. Unless tax collection improves considerably Romania faces a 
budget “shock” at the moment of accession because of inescapable 
financial obligations (co-financing of EU funds; the EU budget contribution; 
etc). Consequently, the budget deficit could rise again above 3% of GDP, 
which would worsen public finances; it would also involve a further rise in 
the current account deficit, which might be unsustainable and cause a 
sharp depreciation of the Leu, eventually, and an inflationary bout, 
consequently.  
• the investment climate is plagued by administrative and red tape barriers, 
by corruption 
• the pensions system is under increasing strain; it is unbalanced, with much 
of its financing coming from the health insurance budget. The problem is of 
a chronic nature, because the number of the retired population exceeds 
the number of statistically official employees (the ratio is nowadays 3:2, as 
compared to 1:2 in the early nineties). Intense migration also complicates 
the story. An unreformed pensions system would strain the public budget in 
the years to come. 
• the agricultural dossier is burdensome and an issue of concern in 
Romania’s relations with the EU. About 35% of the population lives in the 
rural area, while agriculture contributes a mere 12-13% to the GDP 
formation and hardly, if at all, to the public budget. The future of Romanian 
farmers is not a topic much present in the public debate, and the level of 
awareness of what EU accession involves is quite low. In the EU there is an 
increasing propensity to further reform CAP for the sake of reducing 
agricultural subsidies (and allocate more funds to advanced R%D related 
activities); Romania would be adversely affected by such a reordering of 
priorities.  
                                                 
7 For an insightful comparison between the New EU Member States, on one hand, and 
Bulgaria and Romania, on the other hand, see Koromzay (2004, pp 63-67). See also 
Lanzeni (2005) 
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• labor markets are still rigid; unemployment has been kept at a reasonable 
level because many Romanian found an outlet abroad. Some estimates 
put the number of Romanian citizens who work abroad well over 1 million. 
Hopefully, changes in the labor code and reduced social security 
contributions will help redress this situation 
 
III. Policy dilemmas and challenges 
The weaknesses mentioned above and developmental challenges create 
major policy dilemmas which Romanian policy-makers need to address 
carefully in the run-up to and after EU accession; the effectiveness of the 
policy needs to be secured amid a series of trade-offs such as:  
• tight budget deficits that should help bring inflation down to cca. 3-4% by 
2007/2008, while needed infrastructure and environment related projects 
ask for substantial public financing;  
• minimal trade protection and substantial exchange rate appreciation 
could entail further rises in the current account deficit so that the burden of 
adjustment would fall on the public budget increasingly; overburdening of 
the budget policy would be deepened by inflation-targeting at a time 
when EU accession demands ask for higher budget revenues. 
• strong exchange rate appreciation, because of substantial capital inflows 
(including growing remittances from Romanians who work abroad –caa, 
2.5 billion euro in 2004), could cause a  “Dutch disease”8 unless productivity 
gains are adequate. The Italian syndrome should be a lesson in this 
respect! 
• interest rates cuts, while capital account liberalisation proceeds further, 
may widen external deficits;  
• the current type of competitiveness (based on wage differential) vs. the 
innovation-driven type of economies, to which Romania is trying to 
converge (Romania’s spending on research and development is seven 
times lower than the Lisbon target of 3% of GDP)9.  
 
The dilemmas sketched above constrain policy heavily; they suggest, at the 
same time, policy guidelines.  
• In terms of economic and market structure there is need to harden 
budget constraints in the energy sector and streamline state aid –which 
should fit EU requirements. State aid is a policy item that can trigger the 
safeguard clause and delay Romania’s accession.  
                                                 
8 “Dutch disease” refers to a financial bonanza that befalls a country following the 
discovery of, let’s say, major oil fields. Greatly increased oil related export revenues 
would appreciate the national currency exceedingly and harm the manufacturing 
sector, ultimately, unless adequate productivity gains are achieved. 
9 Though, one has to acknowledge that the crux of the matter for the Romanian 
economy (as an emerging economy) lies more in absorbing than in inventing new 
technologies. 
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• Privatization in the energy sector can bring in massive, badly needed 
inward foreign investment and help modernization and restructuring 
decisively. But energy markets (like financial markets) have to be well 
regulated so that market abuse be prevented –which is particularly 
important in a much less affluent society. The experience worldwide should 
be a lesson to Romanian policy-makers.  
• Tax collection and the broadening of the tax base have to improve 
considerably so that the co-financing of EU funds and the provision of 
public goods respond to Romanian economy’s needs; the latter are linked 
with coping with competitive pressures inside the Union without entailing a 
big rise in the budget deficit. It would be great to see budget revenues go 
up by, at least, 4-5% of GDP in a few years time10.  
• Multiannual budget programming has to help policy set priorities 
according to judicious, long term based, cost and benefit analysis.  
• The ongoing crisis of the pensions system puts an additional burden on the 
public budget; a new pensions system is required, that would include 
several pillars (like in Poland).  
• Another big challenge is to increase the capacity to absorb EU funds. EU 
financial assistance (structural and cohesion funds) could supplement 
budget revenues substantially and increase the provision of essential public 
goods (infrastructure, education and health care). EU assistance would 
crowd in other funding, from private and public sources. But the track 
record of absorbtion is poor11 and unless this capacity grows significantly EU 
funds may diminish in the future –against the backdrop of the dispute 
between donor and recipient countries over the structure of the Union’s 
budget. Spain’s experience in using EU funds should be studied by 
Romanian policy-makers. An idea to consider is to form a financial 
institution with the aim of using public and private funds in order to help 
develop infrastructure. Privatization revenues, capital raised by issuing long 
term bonds )on behalf ot his institution) , plus other mobilized resources, 
would be channeled toward financing badly needed projects. The latter 
would have to be prioritezed in view of the modernization challenges of 
the Romanian economy and its EU related obligations, and of the need to 
relieve the public budget of excessive strain.   
• Romania needs to spend substantially more for education and R&D as a 
strategy for long term development (for endogenous growth), even if local 
research and development would be linked primarily to the assimilation of 
imported technology. This is quite normal in an emerging economy, that 
tries to capitalize on the world stock of knowledge. A challenge is to 
reduce the dependency on labor-intensive production (exports), which 
increasingly is dominated by low wage Asian manufacturers. The expected 
and unavoidable rise in wages in the years to come would price out many 
                                                 
10 There are pieces of analyses (including a recent World bank study) that show that 
with proper a reform of the tax collection system would bring in between 4-5% of GDP 
additional budget revenues in Romania; this would involve a broadening of the tax 
collection base. 
11 Currently, this capacity is quite iadequate; for instance, the absorption of ISPA funds 
(infrastructure and environment related projects) is a mere 12%! 
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firms (sectors) in labor intensive production unless productivity  gains are 
commensurate and higher value added products are gaining share in 
output.  
• A rapid expansion of rural credit mechanisms (that involves the efficient 
use of EU rural development funds) and land consolidation would be 
among the solutions for rural development. The fate of Romanian 
agriculture depends on how the Common Agricultural Policy will be 
shaped in the years to come and on how Romania will use the EU financial 
assistance oriented toward this sector.  
• The Romanian economy has distinct characteristics that ask for a careful 
consideration of the appropriate monetary and exchange rate policies; 
low monetisation, the wide use of the12 euro and the US dollar in local 
transactions, complicate the conduct of monetary policy. Likewise, the still 
large stock of arrears and potential future pressures on the government 
budget (such as the high cost of pensions expenditure or fiscal costs in the 
run up to EU entry) require an enhanced co-ordination of monetary and 
exchange rate policies with budget policy.  NBR has introduced inflation 
targeting in August 2005. Arguably, a ‘soft’ form of inflation targeting (a 
gradual introduction) is appropriate13. This ‘soft’ monetary framework 
would focus on inflation but would consider shorter horizon (two-four 
quarters) than the medium term14, it would not neglect exchange rate 
completely and would work closely with the government on budget policy. 
The full opening of capital account would be done at the time of EU 
accession.  
• The labor code has to protect workers against abuses. But it has to make 
labor markets flexible enough so that industrial/economic restructuring 
occurs at an appropriate speed. Romania should not get into a sort of a 
mess one encounters in some of the old EU member countries. The labor 
code issue brings to the fore the model the Romanian economy would 
evolve toward. 
 
IV. Which European model  
Arguably, the European model underlines the need for preserving social 
cohesion and extols the virtues of social solidarity. On the other hand, the 
welfare state, although in a varied form, is a ubiquitous trait of advanced 
capitalism worldwide. And some convergence among the patterns of 
functioning of capitalism has taken place in the last couple of decades under 
the spell of globalization. Likewise, inside Europe, too,  there is significant social 
and economic variety, which makes people differentiate between a 
Scandinavian model (with its emphasis on social redistribution, but quite 
flexible labor markets), a “core” model in Germany and France, the British 
model (which is closer to the American model), and a Mediterranean model, 
                                                 
12 See also Antohi et. al (2003) and Citu (2005) 
13 Daianu and Kallai (2004) 
14 This is because still intense required transformation in the Romanian economy 
complicates the tasks of econometric modeling –which is a must for direct inflation 
targeting. 
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which seems to be of a more “disorderly” sort (although the bulging budget 
deficits in Germany and France have cast some doubt on this view lately). 
Likewise, some new EU member countries (from Central and Eastern Europe) 
practice a more liberal (in the European sense) form of market economy.  
The EU project does influence national public policies by spreading common 
standards and imposing common rules of policy-making and institutional set 
ups. However, the Union is strained by a highly visible contradiction between  
its entrenched welfare model and the need to make markets more flexible.  
This contradiction would not be so acutely felt in the absence of tremendous 
pressures exerted by globalization, by the competition from low wage 
economies (including eastern European neighboring countries). Globalization 
(the economic rise of Asia, in particular)  undermines the lavish welfare state in 
western Europe. Social assistance  and pension systems are being overhauled; 
this painful and politically very sensitive undertaking is taking place against the 
background of population aging. The experience of Finland, Denmark and 
Sweden (in going from welfare to workfare) provides interesting policy venues 
for other EU member countries.  
Although globalization has a non-trivial ideological component the forces at 
work have acquired a powerful momentum of their own, which is driven by 
technological change and intensified competition. The latter can be 
restrained by bouts of protectionism (in trade and competitive devaluations) 
and security concerns, but its power seems to be unstoppable. The rise of 
China and India in the world economy changes hierarchies and can turn non-
zero into zero-sum economic games; thence arises the fear of outsourcing/off-
shoring. For it is quite impossible to compete with economies where labor costs 
are 10, or 15, even 20 times lower, other conditions being fairly similar. 
Romania has to adopt EU rules. But it needs to do it in such a way that its 
economy improves its performance steadily and catching up becomes reality. 
Romania’s labor costs are hugely lower than in most EU member countries, but 
similarly lower is its overall productivity. Therefore, which “European model” to 
evolve to is a relevant policy issue for Romanian policy-makers and heads of 
companies.   
 
V. Final remarks: EU’s role  
In spite of the results of the referenda in France and Holland the EU is a stark, 
indisputable reality and it will stay as such for the foreseeable future. For most 
European non-EU member countries the big political and economic “game” is 
to join the Union.  
The EU can play an exceptional part in Romania’s transformation and 
modernization drive; it is an extraordinary chance to overcome the trap of 
backwardness, to accomplish a secular quest for modernization.  It should be 
noted that Romania has an income per capita that represents roughly 30% 
out of the average of the European Union, being at the same time a country 
with a relatively large population (cca. 22 million),  as compared to the 
average in Central and Eastern Europe. Under the hypothesis of an average 
rate of economic growth of 5%, over the longer run, while the EU average rate 
of economic growth would be 2%, and considering the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect, Romania would need  10-12 years to reach half the average income 
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per capita in the EU. The catching-up of the average income per capita (at 
purchasing power parity) would take about two generations by assuming that 
a substantial growth differential (in Romania’s favor) is maintained.  
A sustained economic progress would require higher saving and investment 
ratios in Romania, a public policy geared to the development of human 
capital and infrastructure, and Romanians’ using increasingly what the new 
ICTs offer15. Romania would have to absorb the EU structural and cohesion 
funds to the utmost. But such evolutions depend, in their turn, on the 
functioning of institutions: the strengthening of the judiciary (the rule of law), a 
competent, honest and innovative (central and local) public administration, a 
solid financial and banking system, good structures of corporate governance 
(orientated towards higher economic performances), an education system 
offering equal chances to children and adults, laws that enjoy social 
acceptability and a favorable social ethos. The quality of public policy itself 
depends on the functioning of our institutions. 
It is pure naiveté to believe that openness towards a wider economic space 
where asymmetries, agglomeration effects and cumulative causality, volatile 
(unstable) financial markets are pretty much present, would ensure, ipso 
facto, economic development. In nowadays’ world extraordinary 
opportunities can coexist with failures of large proportions. If one accepts that 
not any kind of integration brings about benefits16, it makes sense to judge EU 
accession as a possible solution to the secular desire of economic 
development and modernization of the country. This could provide the 
institutional and technological "Big Push" Romania needs in order to reduce 
the economic gaps that separate it from developed European countries17. But 
it does matter how Romania does accede into the EU and how it will fare 
afterwards, for which its public policy is highly accountable. The crux of the 
matter here is to make the benefits of accession countervail its costs to the 
utmost. The variety of performance inside the EU shows it amply. 
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